

In re: SOLOMON ORIAIKHI ) OEIG Case # 10-00464

<sup>1</sup> The complaint also alleged that Mr. Oriakhi verbally abused other DHS employees. During the course of the investigation, the OEIG learned that DHS Secretary Michelle Saddler addressed this issue with Mr. Oriakhi.

## **II. Background**

### **A. Subjects' Duties and Responsibilities**

At all times relevant to the investigation, Solomon Oriakhi was the Director of DHS's Office of Fiscal Services. In that position, his duties and responsibilities included managing the six DHS Fiscal Services Bureaus. Effective February 7, 2011, DHS terminated Mr. Oriakhi's employment.

[This section refers to an employee who received discipline of less than three days' suspension and the Commission has determined in its discretion not to release this information.]

### **B. Information Relating to Expedited Payments to DHS Vendors**

In 2005, DHS created two mechanisms to address vendor financial hardship attributable, at least in part, to delayed payments from the State of Illinois: single expedited payments and recurring expedited payments. A DHS vendor can receive a single expedited payment following a written request that includes, among other things, evidence that 80 percent of the vendor's clients or revenue is derived from work with DHS. A DHS vendor can receive recurring expedited payments for six months following a written request that includes, among other things, documentation evidencing substantial financial hardship, i.e. insufficient operating funds or recent credit denial, and an estimated duration for the expedited payments. After six months, the vendor may reapply for expedited payments. DHS does not permit permanent expedited payment to a vendor.

### **C. Information Relating to Marsol Enterprises, Inc.**

Marsol is a DHS Personal Assistant Provider co-owned by [partner] and Funke Ayeni. Ms. Ayeni is Mr. Oriakhi's wife. In January 2010, DHS authorized three expedited payments to Marsol, totaling \$1,931.37.

## **III. Investigation**

### **A. Expedited Payments to Marsol**

#### *i. Review of Documents Relating to Marsol's Expedited Payments*

OEIG investigators obtained and reviewed DHS expedited payment records. A review of the records revealed that, since 2005, Marsol was one of eight providers that requested expedited payment and one of five for which DHS approved payment. In addition, Marsol was one of three DHS providers that had been approved for "ongoing" expedited payment. The records list the justification for Marsol's ongoing expedited payment as "[p]er Solomon, see e-mail from [employee 1]." [Employee 1's] email, dated January 26, 2010 and sent to [employee 2] and DHS employee [employee 3], was attached to the expedited payment records and included the following information:

[Employee 3],

I wanted to send you this e-mail so you can put it in with your supporting documentation for a vendor expedite. On Wednesday, January 13, 2010, Solomon called me into his office. He asked for me to look for any payments that had either been processed or were in process for Marsol Enterprises Inc. ([vendor number redacted]). I found that there were 3 documents approved on CARS the day before and gave you the information. You used this information to send an expedite request to the Comptroller's. I just ran a Crystal report and see that the 3 warrants have been issued. Solomon requested that these 3 payment documents be expedited and he said to put this vendor on "permanent" expedite. The justification that I was given to put this vendor on expedite was "their (sic) good people." I put the "08" code on VEN3, so all future payments are expedited.

ii. *First Interview of [employee 2] Regarding Expedited Payments*

On December 2, 2010, OEIG investigators interviewed [employee 2]. During the interview, [employee 2] said Mr. Oriakhi asked him to place Marsol on the expedited vendor payment list. [Employee 2] said that Marsol was placed on the expedited payment even though Marsol did not submit any paperwork.

iii. *Interviews of Solomon Oriakhi Regarding Expedited Payments*

On January 26 and 27, 2011, OEIG investigators interviewed Solomon Oriakhi. During the interviews, Mr. Oriakhi said his wife, Funke Daisy Oriakhi, co-owned Marsol. Mr. Oriakhi stated that he has no ownership interest in Marsol but noted that he provided his wife money to inject into the business. Mr. Oriakhi said that he consulted [DHS employee] to determine whether this constituted a conflict of interest and that [DHS employee] responded that no conflict existed.

Mr. Oriakhi said that he did not direct [employee 1] to authorize expedited payments to Marsol. Mr. Oriakhi said that he requested [employee 1] provide Marsol with the necessary paperwork to request expedited payments and to assist Marsol in completing the documentation. Mr. Oriakhi said that, as the Director of Fiscal Services, he did not have the authority to place a vendor on the expedited payment list. Mr. Oriakhi noted that, in order to obtain expedited payment, a vendor must submit documentation to establish eligibility. Mr. Oriakhi said he believed that Marsol would only have received expedited payments if the DHS employees responsible for verifying vendor eligibility had received the proper paperwork.

iv. *Investigative Activity Following Mr. Oriakhi's Interviews*

1. Second Interview of [employee 2]

On February 15, 2011, OEIG investigators reinterviewed [employee 2]. During the interview, [employee 2] said he learned Marsol received expedited payments in January 2010. [Employee 2] noted that he was not in the office when the payments to Marsol were authorized. [Employee 2] stated that he understood that DHS Directors, including Mr. Oriakhi, had

authority to request that a vendor receive expedited payments. [Employee 2] explained that, in other instances, DHS had approved requests for expedited payments received from the DHS Secretary or the Governor's Office that did not include proper eligibility documentation. [Employee 2] stated that, as Mr. Oriakhi's subordinate, he ([employee 2]) was required to comply with Mr. Oriakhi's request. [Employee 2] said, at the time Marsol was authorized to receive expedited payments, he did not know that Mr. Oriakhi's wife was one of the company's co-owners.

## 2. Interviews of [Employee 3] and [Employee 1]

On February 15, 2011, OEIG investigators interviewed DHS employees [employee 3] and [employee 1]. [Employee 3] oversees the DHS Vendor Payment Program. [Employee 1] enters DHS account authorization codes for expedited payments to DHS vendors. During the interviews, each said that, in January 2010, DHS authorized permanent expedited payments to Marsol without Marsol submitting any documentation reflecting eligibility for payment. [Employee 1] recalled that Mr. Oriakhi orally directed him to authorize expedited payments to Marsol. When asked if he could have misunderstood Mr. Oriakhi's direction, [employee 1] responded that Mr. Oriakhi's exact words were "put them on permanent expedite." [Employee 1] stated that, when he questioned Mr. Oriakhi about the reason Marsol should be put on the expedited payment list, Mr. Oriakhi replied, "they're good people." [Employee 1] stated that he believed Mr. Oriakhi's request violated DHS policy but he complied because [employee 2] had previously directed him that if an executive staff member requests that a vendor be added to the expedited payment list, he was to grant the request.

[Employee 3] advised that, on January 13, 2010, [employee 1] requested that she place Marsol on the DHS expedited payment vendor payment list. [Employee 3] recalled that she later learned from [employee 1] that Mr. Oriakhi had directed [employee 1] to expedite all of DHS's outstanding payments to Marsol. [Employee 3] stated that she authorized expedited payments to Marsol because Mr. Oriakhi was in her chain of command. [Employee 3] said she believed she contacted her supervisor, [Employee 2], regarding her concerns that Mr. Oriakhi's request violated DHS protocol. Both [employee 3] and [employee 1] informed investigators that they did not know Mr. Oriakhi's wife co-owned Marsol at the time they authorized the expedited payments.

### **B. Solomon Oriakhi's Misuse of His DHS Laptop**

#### *i. Interviews of [employee 4] Regarding Solomon Oriakhi's DHS Laptop*

On August 24, 2010 and February 15, 2011, OEIG investigators interviewed [employee 4]. [Employee 4's] duties and responsibilities include, among other things, providing computer support to DHS employees and assisting DHS executive staff. During the interviews, [employee 4] said that Mr. Oriakhi requested that she remove a virus from his DHS laptop. [Employee 4] advised that, when she attempted to use Mr. Oriakhi's computer, unprompted pornographic images continuously appeared, which she took as evidence of a virus. [Employee 4] also said, while examining Mr. Oriakhi's computer, she noticed a number of personal files and



applications that the DHS does not use. [Employee 4] stated that she told Mr. Oriakhi that she did not have the proper tools to fix his laptop and returned the computer to him.

*ii. Review of Solomon Oriakhi's DHS Laptop*

OEIG investigators obtained and attempted to review Mr. Oriakhi's DHS laptop hard drive. However, the hard drive was not functional, which prevented the OEIG from retrieving any information.

*iii. Interview of Solomon Oriakhi Regarding Laptop Misuse*

During his January 26, 2011 OEIG interview, Mr. Oriakhi said he did not ask DHS employee [employee 4] to delete files from the laptop. Mr. Oriakhi said he asked [employee 4] to examine his DHS laptop and transfer "non-essential items" from it to enhance the computer's performance. Mr. Oriakhi relayed that some of the non-essential items he wanted transferred could have been unrelated to his DHS position. Mr. Oriakhi explained that he used his DHS laptop to store personal files, access his personal Yahoo e-mail account, and purchase items on eBay and various tennis sites. Mr. Oriakhi stated that he never accessed or downloaded pornography on his DHS laptop. When asked why his DHS laptop was non-responsive when seized by OEIG investigators, Mr. Oriakhi responded that he did not know. Mr. Oriakhi added that the laptop worked the morning OEIG investigators seized it.

#### **IV. Analysis**

**A. Solomon Oriakhi and [redacted] Improperly Allowed DHS to Expedite Payments to Marsol**

The DHS Hardship and Emergency Payments Process Guidelines require that a vendor submit a written request in order to receive expedited payment. Section A(6)(a); Section B(3)(a). Section A(6)(a) states that a vendor may receive a single expedited payment after providing a written illustration that it is experiencing severe financial hardship and that more than 80 percent of its clients or revenue is derived from work with DHS. Section B(3)(a) states that a vendor may receive recurring expedited payments after providing to DHS, in writing, an explanation for the need for expedited payment, documentation supporting the claim of financial hardship, and the estimated time that expedited payments will be necessary. This section limits expedited payments from a single application to six months.

*i. Solomon Oriakhi*

DHS Employee Handbook Chapter V, Performance of Duties, prohibits employees from misusing their official position.

Solomon Oriakhi improperly directed two of his subordinates to violate the DHS Hardship and Emergency Payments Process Guidelines by expediting payments to Marsol. [Employee 2] and [employee 1] both informed investigators that, in January 2010, Mr. Oriakhi requested that they were to authorize expedited payments to Marsol. [Employee 3] also said that she authorized expedited payments to Marsol because [employee 1] told her that Mr. Oriakhi requested it. These witnesses also said neither Mr. Oriakhi nor anyone from Marsol submitted any of the documentation required to obtain expedited payments. [Employee 3] and [employee 1] each said they knew Mr. Oriakhi's request was improper but complied because Mr. Oriakhi was a DHS Director. Because of Mr. Oriakhi's direction, Marsol received \$1,931.37 in expedited payments from DHS without any supportive documentation in violation of DHS policy.

During his OEIG interview, Mr. Oriakhi denied directing anyone to expedite payments to Marsol. Mr. Oriakhi said he requested that [employee 1] provide Marsol with the necessary forms to qualify for expedited payment and ensure Marsol properly completed the forms. Even if this were true, Mr. Oriakhi's request that a subordinate assist a company co-owned by his wife would create at least the appearance of a conflict of interest. However, Mr. Oriakhi's statement is directly contradicted by the statements of [employee 2] and [employee 1]. [Employee 2] and [employee 1's] version of events is supported [employee 1's] January 26, 2010 email to [employee 3] relaying Mr. Oriakhi's request before she authorized the payments. In addition, the fact that Marsol received expedited payments despite the fact they did not submit supporting documentation suggests that Mr. Oriakhi requested that the expedited payments be authorized. Mr. Oriakhi had an incentive to push for the expedited payments, as his wife was a co-owner of the company. [Employee 2], [employee 1], and [employee 3] had no known incentive to improperly authorize an expedited payment to Marsol unless Mr. Oriakhi requested that they do so. The totality of the evidence supports a finding that Mr. Oriakhi directed his subordinate employees to authorize in expedited payment to a company co-owned by his wife in violation of DHS rules. Therefore, this allegation is **FOUNDED**.

ii. [Redacted]

[This section refers to an employee who received discipline of less than three days' suspension and the Commission has determined in its discretion not to release this information.]<sup>2</sup>

#### **B. Solomon Oriakhi Misused His DHS Laptop**

DHS Employee Handbook Section V, Use of Computers, prohibits employees from making personal use of DHS computers.

Solomon Oriakhi misused his DHS laptop. During his OEIG interview, Mr. Oriakhi admitted using his DHS laptop for a variety of personal activities. In addition, [employee 4] informed investigators that she noticed a number of personal files when she examined Mr. Oriakhi's laptop at his direction. Therefore, the allegation that Solomon Oriakhi made personal use of his DHS laptop is **FOUNDED**.

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<sup>2</sup> [redacted]

V. **Recommendations**

Following due investigation, the OEIG issues these findings:

- **FOUNDED** – Solomon Oriakhi and [redacted] improperly allowed DHS to expedited payments to Marsol Enterprises, Inc.
- **FOUNDED** – Solomon Oriakhi misused his DHS laptop computer.

Solomon Oriakhi is no longer a State of Illinois employee; therefore, the OEIG does not currently have jurisdiction over him and cannot recommend discharge. However, given the nature of his misconduct and DHS policy violations, the OEIG recommends that DHS note the OEIG's findings in his personnel file and prohibit Mr. Oriakhi from ever obtaining employment with DHS in the future.

[This sentence refers to an employee who received discipline of less than three days' suspension and the Commission has determined in its discretion not to release this information.]

No further investigation is required and this matter is considered closed.

Pat Quinn, Governor



Michelle R.B. Saddler, Secretary

Office of the Secretary  
401 South Clinton Street • Chicago, Illinois 60607  
100 South Grand Avenue East • Springfield, Illinois 62762

October 14, 2011

Mr. Ricardo Meza  
Executive Inspector General  
Office of the Executive Inspector General  
For the Agencies of the Illinois Governor  
32 West Randolph Street, Suite 1900  
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Re: OEIG Case No: 10-00464

Dear Inspector General Meza:

On September 9, 2011, Office of the Executive Inspector General for the Agencies of the Illinois Governor (OEIG) issued to the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) a final report in this matter and recommended the following:

- Solomon Oriakhi is no longer a State of Illinois employee; therefore, OEIG does not currently have jurisdiction over him and cannot recommend discharge. However, given the nature of his misconduct and DHS policy violations, OEIG recommends that DHS note OEIG's findings in his personnel file and prohibit Mr. Oriakhi from ever obtaining employment with DHS in the future.
- [Redacted information concerning employee who received discipline of less than three days' suspension and the Commission has determined should not be released.]

As recommended by OEIG, DHS will note the findings in Solomon Oriakhi's personnel file and prohibit Oriakhi from obtaining employment with DHS in the future.

[Redacted information concerning same employee.]

Mr. Ricardo Meza  
October 14, 2011  
Page 2 of 2

[Redacted information concerning same employee.]

Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Michelle R.B. Saddler  
Secretary

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RECEIVED  
FEB - 8 2012

EXECUTIVE  
ETHICS COMMISSION

IN THE EXECUTIVE ETHICS COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN RE: SOLOMON ORIAIKHI )

10-00464

RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTIONS FOR REDACTION / PUBLIC RESPONSE

Please check the appropriate line and sign and date below. If no line is checked the Commission will not make your response public if the redacted report is made public.

X Below is my public response. Please make this response public if the summary report is also made public; or

       Below are my suggestions for redaction. I do not wish for these suggestions to be made public.

[signed]  
Respondent's Signature

02/01/2012  
Date

Instructions: Please write or type suggestions for redaction or a public response on the lines below. If you prefer, you may attach separate documents to this form. Return this form and any attachments to:

Illinois Executive Ethics Commission  
401 S. Spring Street, Room 513 Wm. Stratton Building  
Springfield, IL 62706

SEE THE ATTACHED

The EEC

401 spring street

513 William Stratton Building

Springfield, Illinois 62706

Re: Release of redacted OEIG report

NOTE: Below is my public response. Please make this response and the rebuttal of each section of the OEIG report public if the summary report is also made public.

The allegations against me are false and were concocted to justify my termination from DHS by (IDHS-CFO).

#### BACKGROUND

I was hired as IDHS-Fiscal Director beginning August 1, 2003 to replace [redacted] who have worked over 35 years at the DHS. Upon my arrival in Springfield and being introduced to my supervisor [redacted], she not only ignored my hand shake but refused to walk me to my work location. I found my way downstairs to the Fiscal service offices guided by staff from then Secretary's office and introduced myself to [redacted]. I asked if he could direct me to my assigned office. When he replied that an office was not assigned for my use, I went back upstairs to [redacted] who rudely asked that I just find any office to sit in. Not sure what to do I went back to the Secretary's Chief of staff who together with the earlier staff person went with me to request that [redacted] vacate the Fiscal Director's office. He then complied.

Approximately one year after my arrival at the DHS, [redacted] She was replaced by a new CFO until her return to DHS in June of 2010. While she was away and [redacted] she had other assignments, including:

[redacted] management style and toxic personality is evidenced by the numerous allegations of wrong doing, including staff intimidations and Ghost payroll. OEIG report published in late 2010 attest to this fact and the cost to the State of Illinois.

Months before her return to DHS, [redacted] presence was all over DHS, as she visited our OFS office in Springfield frequently. Staff started lying against one another if it would win them job security with [redacted] It was as a result that staff in the Fiscal Office,

[redacted] concocted up the allegation of verbal abuse. Two Office of Fiscal Services (OFS) - staff warned me that they heard [redacted] telling staff that she planned on terminating me as soon as she came on board.

When [redacted] finally came on board in June 2010, she brought [redacted] with her from GOMB. [redacted] worked in the OFS as voucher processing supervisor before leaving DHS for GOMB a couple of years earlier.

Right away [redacted] directed [redacted] who did not understand or possess the capacity to perform my duties to take over my department and give me daily assignments. [redacted] ordered me not to assign tasks to any OFS staff. He said that [redacted] now reported to him. There was mass confusion in OFS as none of these were put in writing. I went to [redacted] several times for clarification and on one occasion she said I should consider [redacted] because he represented her. When I asked that she put this in writing along with her assignments to me because [redacted] was a PSA, I was a SPSA and still responsible for the OFS, [redacted] went wild. She said she could be my worst nightmare, she bragged about her ties to the governor and other higher ups in the administration (names have been deliberately left out). She later apologized for yelling at me.

As Fiscal Services Director, my duties required that I be in Chicago one week and the next in Springfield. Upon my return to Chicago, I reported this incident and other abuses involving [redacted] and [redacted] to Secretary Saddler. The following week when I returned for work to Springfield the abuses escalated. My mail and other reports were thrown in front of my office door. When I asked my assistant [redacted] why my reports were all on the floor and not in my mail basket, she replied that I should ask [redacted]. She went and got [redacted] who came into my office and accused me of being rude and told me no staff in OFS reported to me. [redacted] told me not to ever ask staff in OFS to perform any tasks. I asked to be informed in writing. He then became racially abusive, asking that I go back to Africa where I belong. I went up to [redacted] to report this incident. She said she would talk to [redacted]. She never got back to me to discuss the matter. On that same trip, I went up to [redacted] office, at her request, to update her on the Collections Bureau. She asked that I make [redacted] the Collections Bureau Chief. I advised her that [redacted] was still in the position and doing a great job. [redacted] exploded calling me names, including Black Ass. She said [redacted] was a liar and worthless and ordered me to go and do as I was told. She said it was impossible to live in Chicago and be the Fiscal Director for IDHS. She said she would see to it that I was removed from the position. Upon my return to Chicago I went and relayed all that has happened to Secretary Saddler. She said she wanted a smooth transition. So I agreed to be moved to Chicago in one of the several openings DHS had at the time. It was supposed to be a lateral transfer but after deliberation with [redacted] I was demoted by Secretary Saddler to Compliance Auditor in the Chicago office of contracts, with a cut in pay on August 12, 2011. (See Exhibit #1)

The backlog of Compliance Audits needing to be completed in this unit was enormous. With just one DHS staff tackling as much of the work as he can, much of the work remained undone. (This used to be a unit of over six field Auditors). Overtime paid to this one staff, which lived in Springfield, in one year was enough to fund another FTE.

No sooner had I started working in this unit when [redacted] declared that she was pulling this unit to be placed under [redacted] who now headed the collections bureau in the Fiscal Office. I was terminated by Ms Saddler effective February 6, 2011. I had served seven years and seven months with the state and needed five more months to be fully vested in the state pension. I was denied the opportunity to serve and be vested. During the days preceding my termination a senior staff in the office of contracts (name withheld) warned that when [redacted] is after you and after she knocks you dead, she would come after your Carcass.

It should be noted that the OEIG investigation and the trumped up allegations by OFS staff took place in the period between August, 2010 and February 2011. This is the period after I have been removed as Fiscal Services Director (See Exhibit 1) and coincides with the period when [redacted] returned and was in charge as Chief Fiscal Officer. I submit that [redacted] was behind it all guiding every move.

met daily with

Together they formed a modern day Lynch Squad out to assassinate my character and to discredit my service to DHS and the people of the state of Illinois whom i have served well.

MY RESPONSE/REBUTTAL TO EACH SECTION OF THE REPORT FOLLOWS

IN THE EXECUTIVE ETHICS COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

In re: SOLOMON ORIAIKHI )

OEIG Case # 10-00464

OEIG FINAL REPORT (REDACTED)

Below is a final summary report from an Executive Inspector General. The General Assembly has directed the Commission to redact information from this report that may reveal the identity of witnesses, complainants or informants and "any other information it believes should not be made public." 5 ILCS 430/20-52(b).

The Commission exercises this responsibility with great caution and with the goal of balancing the sometimes competing interests of increasing transparency and operating with fairness to the accused. In order to balance these interests, the Commission may redact certain information contained in this report. The redactions are made with the understanding that the subject or subjects of the investigation have had no opportunity to rebut the report's factual allegations or legal conclusions before the Commission.

The Executive Ethics Commission ("Commission") received a final report from the Governor's Office of Executive Inspector General ("OEIG") and a response from the agency in this matter.

The Commission redacted the final report and mailed copies of the redacted version and responses to the Attorney General, the Governor's Executive Inspector General and to Solomon Oriaikhi at his last known address.

These recipients were given fifteen days to offer suggestions for redaction or provide a response to be made public with the report. The Commission, having reviewed all suggestions received, makes this document available pursuant to 5 ILCS 430/20-

### **RESPONSE/REBUTTAL**

**I believe this process would be fairer if respondents on the Commissions distribution list had my response to review along with the OEIG report before providing their input, in particular the Attorney General's office. The Civil Rights Commission need to be involved in this case.**

### **FINAL REPORT**

#### **I Initial Allegations and Subsequent Allegation**

The Office of Executive Inspector General (OEIG) received a complaint alleging that Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) employee Solomon Oriakhi improperly directed subordinates to authorize expedited payments to DHS vendor Marsol Enterprises, Inc. (Marsol).

The complaint also alleged that Mr. Oriakhi misused his DHS laptop computer.<sup>1</sup> [This sentence refers to an employee who received discipline of less than three days' suspension and the Commission has determined in its discretion not to release this information.]

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<sup>1</sup> The complaint also alleged that Mr. Oriakhi verbally abused other DHS employees. During the course of the investigation, the OEIG learned that DHS Secretary Michelle Saddler addressed this issue with Mr. Oriakhi.

### **RESPONSE/REBUTTAL**

**These allegations are false. I never participated or interfered in the approval/disapproval of expedited payments to DHS vendors, including Marsol Enterprises, Inc.**

**The allegations by \_\_\_\_\_ are false. I have never viewed porno at home or anywhere else regardless of the media. The items (copies) of printed materials made available to the OEIG was obtained illegally by \_\_\_\_\_ from my personal email.**

**The allegation of verbal abuse investigation should have included OFS staff of other races, not just the whites. The OEIG investigation was so biased and skewed that it assumed my guilt without a shred of evidence and sort to confirm it by staff allegations.**



## **II. Background**

### **A. Subjects' Duties and Responsibilities**

At all times relevant to the investigation, Solomon Oriakhi was the Director of DHS's Office of Fiscal Services. In that position, his duties and responsibilities included managing the six DHS Fiscal Services Bureaus. Effective February 7, 2011, DHS terminated Mr. Oriakhi's employment.

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### **C. Information Relating to Marsol Enterprises, Inc.**

Marsol is a DHS Personal Assistant Provider co-owned by [partner] and Funke Ayeni. Ms. Ayeni is Mr. Oriakhi's wife. In January 2010, DHS authorized three expedited payments to Marsol, totaling \$1,931.37

## **RESPONSE/REBUTTAL.**

**II-A The OEIG statement that “ At all times relevant to the investigation, Solomon Oriakhi was the Director of DHS Office of Fiscal Services” is incorrect. I was removed as OFS Director in August 12, 2010 (See Exhibit #1)**

**II-B The DHS expedite process evolved over time to what it became in 2010/2011. When I took over as the DHS-Fiscal Director in August of 2003, there were two types of expedite processes for Vendor Payments**

**1. Payments Mandated by Statute to be expedited: Vendors in this category of payments did not have to submit requests for expedite. Their payments were expedited.**

2. Payments Not mandated by statute to be expedited.: Vendors in this category prior to 2005 depended on action by \_\_\_\_\_ for their Payments to be expedited when experiencing severe hardship. There was no clear process. It was a one man show. \_\_\_\_\_ would be approached by vendors by phone, some would come to the OFS office to plead their case with \_\_\_\_\_. Depending on who the vendor was, \_\_\_\_\_ may then call the Illinois Office of the Controller (IOC) where he was well known, to get payments expedited for them. I received numerous complaints, mostly from vendors from Cook County area who felt left out. DHS Program Directors who were my colleagues would echo the complaints of their Vendors at the executive staff meetings. On many occasions, \_\_\_\_\_ was accused of discrimination by a vendor for the way he handled these vendors who were experiencing hardship and looking to my office for help. \_\_\_\_\_ would ask that I talk to them because they were being rude to him. These vendors were all black and from Cook County.

In 2005, I supervised and guided the creation of the DHS expedite process for non mandated payments. Hardship criteria and approval duration was established by OFS staff. Once in place, \_\_\_\_\_ and I presented the new process to the DHS executive staff several times beginning in late 2005. We distributed expedite forms for vendors use and encouraged program directors to educate and guide vendors on the new process. We also took our training on the newly created process on the road to vendors in Cook county. Distributing forms and educating vendors on the process. One such training conducted by \_\_\_\_\_ and I was in a Jewish establishment in North Chicago.

In all cases, request for expedite must include Vendor financial documents (balance sheets, profit and loss statements evidence of denial of loan request by a bank). The DHS could initiate a audit if misrepresentation by a vendor is suspected.

Shortage of funds was not the only reason for slow payment to vendors. Delays in processing invoices/ voucher submitted to the agency was at that time partially responsible for some delays in payment to a vendor. Invoices go through three DHS levels of approval prior to their submission to the IOC for payment. Level one approval was applied by the receiving program unit/office attesting to receipt of the good/service. Level two was applied by the local office supervisor. Level three was applied by \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ knows vendors whose expedite is expiring and would spend time faxing forms (this was prior to creation of the electronic expedite forms) to vendors and guiding them on phone and in person if they came to the OFS office on how to complete the forms. It was for this reason that I made the three day turnaround rule an objective in \_\_\_\_\_ evaluation. Meaning all vouchers received for level three approval in OFS must be processed within three working days.

The foregoing is to shed light into the DHS expedite process. A process created for vendors to help them during severe hardship. Training, guiding and sharing necessary documents with vendors was encouraged. Our purpose was to help ELIGIBLE VENDORS. The criteria to be met by vendors was clear.

So when I ask \_\_\_\_\_ to provide guidance to all vendors which would include Marsol, this was within the objective of the program and does not constitute a conflict of interest.

The allegation that I asked anyone to place Marsol on any kind of expedite is blatant fallacy. I informed [redacted] about the ownership issue with Marsol in October 2009 and abstained from any involvement with expedite. Marsol, I was told, was eligible and approved when they applied for expedite. If this is so, then [redacted] should be asked why he did not fax the forms to them and provide same assistance as provided to other vendors to record approval/denial based on eligibility.

### **III. Investigation**

#### **A. Expedited Payments to Marsol**

##### *i. Review of Documents Relating to Marsol's Expedited Payments*

OEIG investigators obtained and reviewed DHS expedited payment records. A review of the records revealed that, since 2005, Marsol was one of eight providers that requested expedited payment and one of five for which DHS approved payment. In addition, Marsol was one of three DHS providers that had been approved for "ongoing" expedited payment. The records list the justification for Marsol's ongoing expedited payment as "[p]er Solomon, see e-mail from [employee 1]." [Employee 1's] email, dated January 26, 2010 and sent to [employee 2] and DHS employee [employee 3], was attached to the expedited payment records and included the following information:

[Employee 3],

I wanted to send you this e-mail so you can put it in with your supporting documentation for a vendor expedite. On Wednesday, January 13, 2010, Solomon called me into his office. He asked for me to look for any payments that had either been processed or were in process for Marsol Enterprises Inc. (113820428). I found that there were 3 documents approved on CARS the day before and gave you the information. You used this information to send an expedite request to the Comptroller's. I just ran a Crystal report and see that the 3 warrants have been issued. Solomon requested that these 3 payment documents be expedited and he said to put this vendor on "permanent" expedite. The justification that I was given to put this vendor on expedite was "their (sic) good people." I put the "08" code on VEN3, so all future payments are expedited.

##### *ii. First Interview of [employee 2] Regarding Expedited Payments*

On December 2, 2010, OEIG investigators interviewed [employee 2]. During the interview, [employee 2] said Mr. Oriakhi asked him to place Marsol on the expedited vendor payment list. [Employee 2] said that Marsol was placed on the expedited payment even though Marsol did not submit any paperwork.

### **RESPONSE/REBUTTAL**

III-A Marsol became a DHS service provider in September 2009. I have since found out that Marsol never received guidance from [redacted] and his staff earlier on expedite as was the practice with other service providers. I was not aware because I never involved myself in the day to day tasks involving expedite. Beyond supervising its creation, I was unfamiliar with the expedite records, who was on it and who was not. I never directed nor anyone on his staff to put any DHS vendor on expedite.

*iii. Interviews of Solomon Oriakhi Regarding Expedited Payments*

On January 26 and 27, 2011, OEIG investigators interviewed Solomon Oriakhi. During the interviews, Mr. Oriakhi said his wife, Funke Daisy Oriakhi, co-owned Marsol. Mr. Oriakhi

stated that he has no ownership interest in Marsol but noted that he provided his wife money to

inject into the business. Mr. Oriakhi said that he consulted [DHS employee] to determine whether this constituted a conflict of interest and that [DHS employee] responded that no conflict existed.

Mr. Oriakhi said that he did not direct [employee 1] to authorize expedited payments to Marsol. Mr. Oriakhi said that he requested [employee 1] provide Marsol with the necessary paperwork to request expedited payments and to assist Marsol in completing the documentation.

Mr. Oriakhi said that, as the Director of Fiscal Services, he did not have the authority to place a

vendor on the expedited payment list. Mr. Oriakhi noted that, in order to obtain expedited payment, a vendor must submit documentation to establish eligibility. Mr. Oriakhi said he believed that Marsol would only have received expedited payments if the DHS employees responsible for verifying vendor eligibility had received the proper paperwork.

**RESPONSE/REBUTTAL**

When I found out in late September 2009 that Marsol was approved to provide services for DHS, I consulted with [redacted] who also served as

[redacted] advised that I seek the opinion of the DHS ethics officer whose office was also in the same building. I later met our ethics officer (not just another DHS employee as indicated in the OEIG report) and expressed my concern because my wife has a ownership interest in Marsol. She asked me a series of questions and asked to get back with me. I returned to Chicago and the following week when I returned to Springfield, I went back to see her. She advised based on relevant criteria which she discussed with me that no conflict of interest existed. I later found out that she questioned [redacted] and other OFS staff before she gave me her response.

**I was asked by the OEIG if I received money from Marsol, to which I responded that it was the other way around. My wife is a house wife. She does not have a job so it is from the money she gets from me that she uses to support herself in her business. I never said that I gave her money to inject into the business.**

*iv. Investigative Activity Following Mr. Oriakhi's Interviews*

1. Second Interview of [employee 2]

On February 15, 2011, OEIG investigators reinterviewed [employee 2]. During the interview, [employee 2] said he learned Marsol received expedited payments in January 2010.

[Employee 2] noted that he was not in the office when the payments to Marsol were authorized. [Employee 2] stated that he understood that DHS Directors, including Mr. Oriakhi, had authority to request that a vendor receive expedited payments. [Employee 2] explained that, in other instances, DHS had approved requests for expedited payments received from the DHS Secretary or the Governor's Office that did not include proper eligibility documentation. [Employee 2] stated that, as Mr. Oriakhi's subordinate, he ([employee 2]) was required to comply with Mr. Oriakhi's request. [Employee 2] said, at the time Marsol was authorized to receive expedited payments, he did not know that Mr. Oriakhi's wife was one of the company's co-owners.

2. Interviews of [Employee 3] and [Employee 1]

On February 15, 2011, OEIG investigators interviewed DHS employees [employee 3] and [employee 1]. [Employee 3] oversees the DHS Vendor Payment Program. [Employee 1] enters DHS account authorization codes for expedited payments to DHS vendors. During the interviews, each said that, in January 2010, DHS authorized permanent expedited payments to Marsol without Marsol submitting any documentation reflecting eligibility for payment. [Employee 1] recalled that Mr. Oriakhi orally directed him to authorize expedited payments to Marsol. When asked if he could have misunderstood Mr. Oriakhi's direction, [employee 1] responded that Mr. Oriakhi's exact words were "put them on permanent expedite." [Employee 1] stated that, when he questioned Mr. Oriakhi about the reason Marsol should be put on the expedited payment list, Mr. Oriakhi replied, "they're good people." [Employee 1] stated that he believed Mr. Oriakhi's request violated DHS policy but he complied because [employee 2] had previously directed him that if an executive staff member requests that a vendor be added to the expedited payment list, he was to grant the request.

[Employee 3] advised that, on January 13, 2010, [employee 1] requested that she place Marsol on the DHS expedited payment vendor payment list. [Employee 3] recalled that she later learned from [employee 1] that Mr. Oriakhi had directed [employee 1] to expedite all of DHS's outstanding payments to Marsol. [Employee 3] stated that she authorized expedited payments to Marsol because Mr. Oriakhi was in her chain of command. [Employee 3] said she believed she contacted her supervisor, [Employee 2], regarding her concerns that Mr. Oriakhi's request



violated DHS protocol. Both [employee 3] and [employee 1] informed investigators that they did not know Mr. Oriakhi's wife co-owned Marsol at the time they authorized the expedited payments.

### **RESPONSE/REBUTTAL**

**These allegations are false. My direct contacts as Fiscal Services Director were the Chiefs of my six bureaus. and with whom I interacted daily on tasks and in weekly meetings. He knew the situation with Marsol because I told him. To allege that I would direct these staff to perjure themselves by directing that they put any Vendor on permanent expedite because they are good people is BLATANT FALASY. In all the period that I served as Fiscal services Director, only the DHS Secretary, Assistant Secretary and GOMB, via Mail Control, has ever directed approval of a expedited payment for a vendor without eligibility documentation and approval. Other Executive staff, mostly from the program areas, would often request that OFS provide a vendor with the forms and guide them on how to prepare it. But no other executive staff has the authority to approve an expedited payment without proper documentation and approval.**

#### **B Solomon Oriakhi's Misuse of His DHS Laptop**

##### *i. Interviews of [employee 4] Regarding Solomon Oriakhi's DHS Laptop*

On August 24, 2010 and February 15, 2011, OEIG investigators interviewed [employee 4]. [Employee 4's] duties and responsibilities include, among other things, providing computer support to DHS employees and assisting DHS executive staff. During the interviews, [employee 4] said that Mr. Oriakhi requested that she remove a virus from his DHS laptop. [Employee 4] advised that, when she attempted to use Mr. Oriakhi's computer, unprompted pornographic images continuously appeared, which she took as evidence of a virus. [Employee 4] also said, while examining Mr. Oriakhi's computer, she noticed a number of personal files and applications that the DHS does not use. [Employee 4] stated that she told Mr. Oriakhi that she did not have the proper tools to fix his laptop and returned the computer to him.

##### *ii. Review of Solomon Oriakhi's DHS Laptop*

OEIG investigators obtained and attempted to review Mr. Oriakhi's DHS laptop hard drive. However, the hard drive was not functional, which prevented the OEIG from retrieving any information.

##### *iii. Interview of Solomon Oriakhi Regarding Laptop Misuse*

During his January 26, 2011 OEIG interview, Mr. Oriakhi said he did not ask DHS employee [employee 4] to delete files from the laptop. Mr. Oriakhi said he asked [employee 4] to examine his DHS laptop and transfer "non-essential items" from it to enhance the computer's performance. Mr. Oriakhi relayed that some of the non-essential items he wanted transferred

could have been unrelated to his DHS position. Mr. Oriakhi explained that he used his DHS laptop to store personal files, access his personal Yahoo e-mail account, and purchase items on eBay and various tennis sites. Mr. Oriakhi stated that he never accessed or downloaded pornography on his DHS laptop. When asked why his DHS laptop was non-responsive when seized by OEIG investigators, Mr. Oriakhi responded that he did not know. Mr. Oriakhi added that the laptop worked the morning OEIG investigators seized it.

## **RESPONSE/REBUTTAL**

Note that the OEIG interview of employee 4 \_\_\_\_\_, on August 24, 2010 took place immediately after I was demoted to an Auditor position in Chicago. As stated earlier, I was harassed and verbally abused by \_\_\_\_\_ and her OFS-select staff, prior to my demotion. The DHS uses the Consolidated Accounting and Reporting System(CARS).

\_\_\_\_\_ worked as a clerical, providing USER SUPPORT to CARS users. The Management Information Systems (MIS) division was responsible for computer hardware and software support at the DHS.

I did not request that \_\_\_\_\_ remove a virus from my DHS laptop. I had asked my systems support bureau chief, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ computer hardware/software needs to look into getting a new laptop to replace the one I have which was very old and are being surplusd by the DHS. It was after my request that \_\_\_\_\_ came to me to ask what problem I was having with my laptop and offered to help. She said by aligning the files better, she could improve its performance. I believe when she took my laptop, she hacked into my files including my non DHS email looking for anything she could find to incriminate me. It should be noted that \_\_\_\_\_

I have my own laptop at home which I used for non DHS needs. While away from home in Springfield, it is possible that may have used my DHS laptop to receive a personal email from family if it was a urgent need. This in my opinion is circumstantial and does not rise to the level of MISUSE as determined by the OEIG.

## **IV. Analysis**

### **A. Solomon Oriakhi and [redacted] Improperly Allowed DHS to Expedite Payments to Marsol**

The DHS Hardship and Emergency Payments Process Guidelines require that a vendor submit a written request in order to receive expedited payment. Section A(6)(a); Section B(3)(a). Section A(6)(a) states that a vendor may receive a single expedited payment after providing a written illustration that it is experiencing severe financial hardship and that more than 80 percent of its clients or revenue is derived from work with DHS. Section B(3)(a) states that a vendor may receive recurring expedited payments after providing to DHS, in writing, an explanation for the need for expedited payment, documentation supporting the claim of financial hardship, and

the estimated time that expedited payments will be necessary. This section limits expedited payments from a single application to six months.

i. *Solomon Oriakhi*

DHS Employee Handbook Chapter V, Performance of Duties, prohibits employees from misusing their official position.

Solomon Oriakhi improperly directed two of his subordinates to violate the DHS Hardship and Emergency Payments Process Guidelines by expediting payments to Marsol. [Employee 2] and [employee 1] both informed investigators that, in January 2010, Mr. Oriakhi requested that they were to authorize expedited payments to Marsol. [Employee 3] also said that she authorized expedited payments to Marsol because [Employee 1] told her that Mr. Oriakhi requested it. These witnesses also said neither Mr. Oriakhi nor anyone from Marsol submitted any of the documentation required to obtain expedited payments. [Employee 3] and [employee 1] each said they knew Mr. Oriakhi's request was improper but complied because Mr. Oriakhi was a DHS Director. Because of Mr. Oriakhi's direction, Marsol received \$1,931.37 in expedited payments from DHS without any supportive documentation in violation of DHS policy.

During his OEIG interview, Mr. Oriakhi denied directing anyone to expedite payments to Marsol. Mr. Oriakhi said he requested that [employee 1] provide Marsol with the necessary forms to qualify for expedited payment and ensure Marsol properly completed the forms. Even if this were true, Mr. Oriakhi's request that a subordinate assist a company co-owned by his wife would create at least the appearance of a conflict of interest. However, Mr. Oriakhi's statement is directly contradicted by the statements of [employee 2] and [employee 1]. [Employee 2] and [employee 1's] version of events is supported [employee 1's] January 26, 2010 email to [employee 3] relaying Mr. Oriakhi's request before she authorized the payments. In addition, the fact that Marsol received expedited payments despite the fact they did not submit supporting documentation suggests that Mr. Oriakhi requested that the expedited payments be authorized. Mr. Oriakhi had an incentive to push for the expedited payments, as his wife was a co-owner of the company. [Employee 2], [employee 1], and [employee 3] had no known incentive to improperly authorize an expedited payment to Marsol unless Mr. Oriakhi requested that they do so. The totality of the evidence supports a finding that Mr. Oriakhi directed his subordinate employees to authorize in expedited payment to a company co-owned by his wife in violation of DHS rules. Therefore, this allegation is **FOUNDED**.

ii. [Redacted]

[This section refers to an employee who received discipline of less than three days' suspension and the Commission has determined in its discretion not to release this information.]

**B. Solomon Oriakhi Misused His DHS Laptop**

DHS Employee Handbook Section V, Use of Computers, prohibits employees from

making personal use of DHS computers.

Solomon Oriakhi misused his DHS laptop. During his OEIG interview, Mr. Oriakhi admitted using his DHS laptop for a variety of personal activities. In addition, [employee 4] informed investigators that she noticed a number of personal files when she examined Mr. Oriakhi's laptop at his direction. Therefore, the allegation that Solomon Oriakhi made personal use of his DHS laptop is **FOUNDED**.

## **V. Recommendations**

Following due investigation, the OEIG issues these findings:

> **FOUNDED** - Solomon Oriakhi and [redacted] improperly allowed DHS to expedite payments to Marsol Enterprises, Inc.

> **FOUNDED** - Solomon Oriakhi misused his DHS laptop computer.

Solomon Oriakhi is no longer a State of Illinois employee; therefore, the OEIG does not currently have jurisdiction over him and cannot recommend discharge. However, given the nature of his misconduct and DHS policy violations, the OEIG recommends that DHS note the OEIG's findings in his personnel file and prohibit Mr. Oriakhi from ever obtaining employment with DHS in the future.

[This sentence refers to an employee who received discipline of less than three days' suspension and the Commission has determined in its discretion not to release this information.]

No further investigation is required and this matter is considered closed.

## **RESPONSE/REBUTTAL**

**The OEIG investigation was biased and flawed and sort only to gather information to support unsubstantiated allegations against me.**

## **EXPEDITE**

**I could have filled out the Expedite form and have it submitted for Marsol but I steered clear and abstained from any appearance of a conflict of interest involving Marsol by not involving myself in ALL expedite approval and processing verbally or in writing. Yet the OEIG used false allegations to Claim these allegations were FOUNDED.**

## **LAPTOP**

My DHS laptop was never used to further personal business or political interests. The two items downloaded while away from my base on official duty in Springfield were receipts for items purchased from websites on my own pc at home for my daughter. The other two items the OEIG showed me were illegally obtained by hacking into my personal email. There are state employees in very high positions with more serious violations of state pc/laptop policies who are still in state employment. I have been demoted and terminated from my state job and denied the opportunity to secure state pension for me and my family. Yet the DHS and continue to harass me.

I urge the commission to re- review the OEIG recommendation, in view of the additional information provided and reverse the OEIG and Secretary Saddler's position to place these unsubstantiated findings in my DHS personnel file and prohibit me from ever obtaining employment with DHS in the future.

I thank the commission for the opportunity to respond to these allegations.

Sincerely,

Solomon Oriaikhi



---

**From:**  
**Sent:** Monday, January 24, 2011 4:10 PM  
**To:**  
**Cc:**  
**Subject:** RE: cancel of salary reduction

Effective February 7, 2011, Solomon Oriakhi's employment with DHS will terminate.

Thank you.

**From:**  
**Sent:** Monday, January 24, 2011 3:17 PM  
**To:**  
**Cc:**  
**Subject:** RE: cancel of salary reduction

Liz:

By chance would you have a signed resignation letter from Solomon that we could get for his file. Thank you.

---

**From:**  
**Sent:** Monday, January 24, 2011 3:15 PM  
**To:**  
**Cc:**  
**Subject:** cancel of salary reduction

Liz:

PRINTED

01

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES  
PERSONNEL/POSITION ACTION FORM

02

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

## EMPLOYEE INFORMATION

LAST NAME			FIRST NAME			INIT	SEX	RACE	VET	EDUC	DATE OF BIRTH	
ORIAIKHI			SOLOMON				M	B	N	6		
STREET ADDRESS						CITY		COUNTY	STATE	ZIP CODE	NATL. ORIG.	
								016	IL			
PAY PLAN	PAY GRADE	PAY STEP	SALARY	PAY RATE	FULL/PT TIME	FUNDING BRD COM	PAYROLL DEPT	CODE APPROP	CORRECTED SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	BARGAINING UNIT CODE	PERF. CODE	
5	52	00	8025	00	M	F	00	10	115			
CONTINUOUS SERVICE DATE			SENIORITY DATE		CREDITABLE SERVICE DATE		APPT EXPIRATION DATE		STATUS		SUSPENSION/LOA RETURN DATE	
09-01-2003					08-01-2010				F			
									EX000			

## POSITION INFORMATION

POSITION TITLE (NAME)			POSITION NUMBER			EXMT CODE	WORK COUNTY	AJ AUTH	AUDIT	POS DES COMP
SPSA			40070-10-04-300-00-01			3	016			

## TRANSACTION INFORMATION

TRANSACTION NAME		TRANS CODE	EFFECTIVE DATE	PRIOR -ITY
1				
2				
3				
4				
1	TERM NON CERTIFIED	BA125	02-07-2011	
2				
3				
4				

**STATUS**

A-CERTIFIED

B-PROBATIONARY 4 MOS

C-PROBATIONARY 6 MOS

D-PROVISIONAL

E-3 MONTHS CERTIFICATION

F-EXEMPT

G-TEMPORARY

H-EMERGENCY

I-8 MONTHS CERTIFICATION

J-TRAINEE (OC LIST)

K-TRAINEE (TRAINEE PERMIT)

L-TRAINEE (AGENCY SELECTED)

M-9 MONTHS CERTIFICATION

N-12 MONTHS CERTIFICATION

O-137 DAYS

P-18 MONTHS (UMP)

Q-INTERIM ASSIGNMENT

**RACE**

A-NATIVE AMERICAN

B-AFRICAN AMERICAN

O-ASIAN

S-HISPANIC

W-WHITE

**CODES**

**EXEMPT**

0-NOT EXEMPT

1-PRIVATE SEC & CONF ASSTNT

2-ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD

3-POLICY MAKER

4-PREVAILING RATE/TRADE

5-LICENSED ATTORNEY

6-OUT OF STATE

7-TECH ADVSR INDSTL COMMIS

8-PARTIAL EXTENSION

9-PARTIAL EXMPT BY STATUTE

**EDUCATION**

1-GRADE SCHOOL

2-SOME HIGH SCHOOL

3-HS GRAD OR GED

4-SOME COLLEGE

5-BA/BS

6-MA/MS

7-PHD/MD

8-OTHER DEGREE

## REMARKS

Personnel DL

Payroll 127

Insurance 127

Timekeeping 127

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE (REQUIRED ON VOLUNTARY ACTION)

DATE

AGENCY APPROVAL (OPTIONAL)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF PERSON SERVING EMP/DISC

DATE

AGENCY BUDGETARY (OPTIONAL)

DATE

BY MAIL ☐ IN PERSON ☐

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES

DATE

AGENCY HEAD APPROVAL

DATE

1264

PRINTED

01

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES  
PERSONNEL/POSITION ACTION FORM

02

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

## EMPLOYEE INFORMATION

03			04		05	06	07	08							
LAST NAME			FIRST NAME		INIT	SEX	RACE	VET	EDUC	DATE OF BIRTH					
ORIAIKHI			SOLOMON			M	B	N	6						
09				10		11		12	13		13A				
STREET ADDRESS				CITY		COUNTY		STATE	ZIP CODE	NATL ORIG					
						016		IL							
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		22A	22B				
PAY PLAN	PAY GRADE	PAY STEP	SALARY	PAY RATE	FULL/PT TIME	FUNDING BRD COM	PAYROLL DEPT	CODE APPROP	CORRECTED SOCIAL SECURITY NO	BARGAINING UNIT CODE	PERF. CODE				
5	52	00	8447	00	M	F	00	10	115						
5	52	00	8025	00	M	F	00	10	115	EX000					
23			24		25		26		27		28		29		29A
CONTINUOUS SERVICE DATE			SENIORITY DATE		CREDITABLE SERVICE DATE		APPT. EXPIRATION DATE		STATUS		SUSPENSION/LOA RETURN DATE		APPT. REQ. NO.		HANDL CAP
09-01-2003					08-01-2010				F						

## POSITION INFORMATION

30		31		32	33	34	35	36
POSITION TITLE (NAME)		POSITION NUMBER		EXMT CODE	WORK COUNTY	AI AUTH	AUDIT	POS DES COMP
SPSA		40070-10-04-300-00-01		3	016			

## TRANSACTION INFORMATION

37		38	39	40	CODES	
TRANSACTION NAME		TRANS CODE	EFFECTIVE DATE	PRIOR -ITY	STATUS	EXEMPT
1	EXEMPT CODE APPT	BA045	08-01-2010	0	A-CERTIFIED	0-NOT EXEMPT
2					B-PROBATIONARY 4 MOS	1-PRIVATE SEC & CONF ASSTNT
3					C-PROBATIONARY 6 MOS	2-ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD
4					D-PROBATIONARY 8 MOS	3-POLICY MAKER
1	SALARY ADJUSTMENT (DECREASE)	BA333	08-01-2010	1	E-3 MONTHS CERTIFICATION	4-PREVAILING RATE/TRADE
2					F-EXEMPT	5-LICENSED ATTORNEY
3					G-TEMPORARY	6-OUT OF STATE
4					H-EMERGENCY	7-TECH ADVSR INDSTL COMMIS
1					I-6 MONTHS CERTIFICATION	8-PARTIAL EXTENSION
2					J-TRAINEE (DC LIST)	9-PARTIAL EXEMPT BY STATUTE
3					K-TRAINEE (TRAINEE PERMIT)	
4					L-TRAINEE (AGENCY SELECTED)	
1					M-9 MONTHS CERTIFICATION	EDUCATION
2					N-12 MONTHS CERTIFICATION	1-GRADE SCHOOL
3					O-137 DAYS	2-SOME HIGH SCHOOL
4					P-18 MONTHS (JUMP)	3-HS GRAD OR GED
1					Q-INTERIM ASSIGNMENT	4-SOME COLLEGE
2						5-BAVS
3						6-MAJMS
4						7-PHD/MD
1					RACE	8-OTHER DEGREE
2					A-NATIVE AMERICAN	
3					B-AFRICAN AMERICAN	
4					C-ASIAN	
1					D-HISPANIC	
2					E-WHITE	

## MARKS

APPROVED 163 ATTACHED

Personnel 8-13

Payroll 8-13

Insurance 8-13

Timekeeping

EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE (REQUIRED ON VOLUNTARY ACTION)

DATE

AGENCY APPROVAL (OPTIONAL)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF PERSON SERVING SUS/DISC

DATE

AGENCY BUDGETARY (OPTIONAL)

DATE

BY MAIL ☐ IN PERSON ☐

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES

DATE

AGENCY HEAD APPROVAL

DATE

27

Exhibit 11 - Page 3

**Page 4**  
**CMS-163 (Special Salary Request)**

DHS-OHR-BES

JUL 30 2010



Agency: \_\_\_\_\_

Dept. of Human Services

Position Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Senior Public Service Administrator, Opt 2

Candidate Name (CMS-100 Attached): \_\_\_\_\_ Social Security Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Oriaikhi, Solomon

Minimum Training / Education Required: \_\_\_\_\_ Candidate's Training / Education: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Minimum Experience Required: \_\_\_\_\_ Candidate's Experience: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Monthly Base Salary Requested: \_\_\_\_\_ Pay Step: \_\_\_\_\_ Candidate's Current or Most Recent Monthly Base Salary: \_\_\_\_\_ Percent (%) Increase: \_\_\_\_\_

8025.00 \_\_\_\_\_ \$8447.00

-5% **DECREASE**

Salary Adjustment Relation (Check one Below):

Entrance Salary	Reinstatement	Promotion	Transfer	Interim Assignment	Temporary Assignment	Best Interest	Additional Duties & Responsibilities	Agency Error or Oversight	Other
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Justification for Request:

Mr. Oriaikhi is being placed into a new exempt appointment with substantially decreased responsibilities therefore DHS is requesting to decrease his salary by 5%.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Desired Effective Date (not required): \_\_\_\_\_ ePAR #: \_\_\_\_\_

7-16-10 \_\_\_\_\_ 49887

Agency Head Approval Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Director of Central Management Services' Approval Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Effective Date (to be completed by CMS) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ 7/15/2010 OR LATER

\_\_\_\_\_

Send Request To: \_\_\_\_\_

Department of Central Management Services  
 Bureau of Personnel  
 Room 505 Stratton Bldg.  
 401 S. Spring Street  
 Springfield, IL 62706

2010 JUL 15 PM 1:27

INSTRUCTIONS

Section I (To be completed by designated agency personnel)

Name of Agency Department of Human Services IDHR Region 1  
 Facility /Unit Contract Admin Candidate's Name Oria Kiki, Solomon  
 Title of Job to be filled SPSA, opt 2 Pay Grade   
 Number to be filled 1 Position Number 40070-10-04-300-00-01  
 EO Job Category Officials-managers Employment Date 8-1-10

Is this EEO Category underutilized? Yes X No  If yes, by which of the following:  
 African-Americans P Hispanics P Women P Asians P Native Americans P Disabled 13

Indicate: Sex of person(s) selected M  
 Race of person(s) selected B  
 Veteran or non-Veteran N  
 Disability, if any N-A

Number of individuals who applied or were on the list of eligible(s) 0  

<u></u> were African American	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected
<u></u> were Hispanic,	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected
<u></u> were Women,	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected
<u></u> were Asian,	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected
<u></u> were Native American,	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected
<u></u> were Veterans,	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected
<u></u> were Disabled,	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected
<u></u> were Undefined,	<u></u> invited,	<u></u> interviewed,	<u></u> selected

If no candidates from any of the underutilized groups appeared on the list, what efforts were made in the last six months to assist in the recruitment of candidates?

If the category is underutilized and a member of an affirmative action group applied and was not hired give a detailed explanation for the hiring decision.

Was the position posted? No

Name and position of person(s) who interviewed candidates. N-A

Name and position of person(s) who recommended the selection of the candidate. Per Secretary Saddler

Section II (To be signed by agency EEO/AA Officer and Chief Executive Officer or their designees)

~~have reviewed the eligibility list and concur~~ do not concur with this hire. Remarks on reverse side.

EEO/AA Officer 8/13/2010  
 Date

approve of this hire.

Aug 13 10  
 Date

Chief Executive Officer  
 An oversight occurred in the processing of paperwork and the EEO monitor was not completed prior to the effective date of the transaction. The EEO monitor was completed immediately once it was realized the form was not completed; therefore, the form is dated after the effective date of the transaction.  
 on 2520.770(i)]